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A holistic approach to spirituality indicates a spiritual development that is relevant for all students
and not just for those who have a religious background. However, debates in England surrounding
spirituality in education often generally locate it within the religious domain (Blake, 1996; Carr,
1995, 1999; Isherwood, 1999). Conceptualizing spirituality in such a way tends to deny access to
this development for non-religious students or students in non-religious contexts. Alternatively the
other approaches to spirituality have adopted non-religious viewpoints (see Erricker, 2003, p. 7).
Such either/or approaches work against the notion that spirituality should be conceived as intrinsic
to the enterprise of education. This paper offers a brief view of a more elaborate existential
framework of spirituality which has been developed in order to transcend the religious/secular
divide. A short account of Existentialist philosophy is provided before an outline of the framework
is discussed.
Keywords: Existential; Subjectivity; Kierkegaard; Heidegger
Introduction
Educative development of spirituality should be made possible for all learners. It is
therefore necessary to conceptualize spirituality as being much broader than some-
thing that pertains only to a Christian view or to religion in general—or even to
non-religious views. Perspectives of spirituality that are located within these either/or
categories are problematic, particularly for educators working in pluralistic contexts
such as government schools. This paper proposes an existential framework of
spirituality that transcends the religious/secular divide.
Spirituality is understood to involve an engagement with the meaning of one’s life,
and Existential philosophy is founded upon the premise that human individuals have
a concern for the meaning of their being. It is argued here that an existential
framework transcends ‘objective’ cosmological and religious perspectives, and ‘sub-
jective’ perspectives which centre an atomistic notion of the individual. As such, this
framework can be used to assist to embrace both secular and religious views. Before
an outline of the framework can be discussed, it is useful to first clarify the particular
existential perspective that is being adopted here. Such a clarification will allow the
basis of the framework to be better understood.
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An existential perspective
Some scholars within education have engaged with Existentialism and the ‘existen-
tial world’ (Dewey, 1958, p. 45). Some of these have argued that the purpose of
existential philosophy is to encourage the individual to become ‘fully human’, and
not to succumb to the spiritual poverty (Barrett, 1990, p. 45) and dehumanizing
forces of society which tend to reduce people to things (Kneller, 1971, p. 72).
Existentialism is described by Morris (1969, p. 283) as ‘a theory of individual
meaning’ where the individual is asked ‘to ponder the reason for his existing’. In
education, Existentialism is understood to offer a revolt against highly technical
approaches to the curriculum which lose the individual (Niblett, 1954, p. 107), and
to offer a spiritual medicine (Morris, 1990, p. 2) by promoting a sense of awareness
of one’s human dignity (Vandenberg, 1987, p. 5). In short, an existential perspective
provides ‘an alternative paradigm for schooling that places the developmental needs
of students as persons ahead of the materialistic concerns of a consumer nation’
(Yob, 1995, p. 104).
However, the term ‘Existentialism’ is not a singular philosophy nor is it able to
completely contain any of the individual contributors to it. No one definition of
Existentialism could provide a doctrine to which all of these thinkers would adhere.
It has even been argued that an attempt to define Existentialism would actually work
against the very purposes of the individual philosophers involved (Oaklander, 1992,
p. ix). Cooper (1999) suggests that while ‘Existentialism’ might indicate an inte-
grated system of themes and ideas, he rather adopts the expression ‘existentialist
philosophy’ because the focus is the existing individual—the Existentialist. This
approach is much more in keeping with the spirit of the major contributors like
Kierkegaard (1992, vol. 1, p. 118) who argued that the notions of ‘system’ and
‘existence’ are polar opposites.
While there is no singular ‘existential perspective’, one is here crafted by selectively
emphasizing particular perspectives of some theorists (especially Heidegger and
Kierkegaard) at the expense of others, and by maintaining a degree of conceptual
generality. For example, some of Sartre’s popular notions of individual freedom are
not included within the perspective given here because his description does not
integrate well with the other concepts.
As a term, Existentialism is derived from the word existence, implying that the
individual has presence-in-the-world. Heidegger included the hyphen in his term
Ek-sistenz to accentuate the Greek and Latin origins which mean ‘to stand out from’
and applied it to mean that the individual stands out from, or beyond, his or her
present. He described this as ‘possibilities’ or ‘ways to be’, and explained it as, ‘The
analysis of the characteristics of the being of Da-sein [meaning the individual ‘there
being’ or being there] is an existential one. This means that the characteristics are
not properties of something objectively present, but essentially existential ways to be’
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 126). Heidegger drew upon the etymological roots of Existen-
tialism to indicate that the individual has possibilities of being, beyond his or her given
present conditions. He (Heidegger, 1996, p. 301) even stated that the primary
meaning of existentiality ‘is the future’.
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An existential framework of spirituality 9
As an entity, Dasein is quite different from the inanimate objects that are present,
which are there by ‘fact’ and have no ‘world’. Heidegger referred to these objects as
having factuality, which he contrasted with Dasein which has facticity. He argued
that ‘the concept of facticity implies that an ‘inner worldly’ being has being-in-the-
world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the
being of those beings which it encounters within its own world’ (Heidegger, 1996,
p. 52). Dasein is not, however, totally independent from these inanimate entities,
but finds itself ‘thrown’ into their presence, which for example, include such things
as culture, language and whether one is male or female. Therefore one’s facticity or
‘thrownness’ has great influence upon how an individual makes sense of himself or
herself, and the world in which he or she has presence.
Heidegger used the term existential to refer to the structure of the individual in
general. He designated his term existentiell to mean self-understanding, how an
individual understands himself or herself. But this self-understanding is only poss-
ible through existence itself, as Heidegger often emphasized the practicality of his
lived philosophy. He argued that ‘We come to terms with the question of existence
always only through existence itself. We shall call this kind of understanding of itself
existentiell understanding’ (Heidegger, 1996, p. 10). These questions of existence
addressing the meaning of one’s being (rather than the metaphysical concern
regarding what one’s being might be) is argued here to have great value in forming
a framework for spirituality which engages with ‘the search for the meaning and
purpose in life’ (National Curriculum Council, 1993, p. 2) and ‘questions which are
‘at the heart and root of existence’’ (Ofsted, 1994, p. 8) and can embrace both
religious and non-religious views.
An existential framework of spirituality
Certain aspects of existential philosophy are now to be emphasized in order to
inform a framework of spirituality. These various aspects include subjectivity,
authenticity, angst, crisis, death and freedom. These have been chosen because they
all have a bearing on how the individual comes to understand the meaning and
purpose of his or her existence which is argued here to be the central concern of
spirituality. What follows are some of the attributes of this framework which centres
the concern an individual has for the meaning of his or her being.
Subjectivity
A major concept of Existentialist philosophy is subjectivity. This was so important
for Kierkegaard (1992, vol 1, p. 203) that he declared ‘subjectivity is truth’. By
‘subjectivity’ Kierkegaard did not mean arbitrariness but rather inwardness where an
individual is able to penetrate into her or his personality in an effort to determine the
source of her or his values and actions. His method was not so much an attempt to
deny objective truths, because objectivity is not a concern for his perspective. He
claimed that the objective what of knowledge could only ever be an approximation
anyhow, and asserted that the emphasis should be on the how. He stated ‘Objectively
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the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said’, and
argued that ‘An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most
passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person’
(Kierkegaard, 1992, vol.1, pp. 202–203). As summarized by Wahl (1969, p. 20),
‘this doctrine is related to what Kierkegaard calls the doctrine of how. The crucial
thing is not what I believe in—not in the object of my belief—but the way in which
I believe that object’. Existential inwardness is awareness on the part of the
individual that one’s existence is in one’s thinking and that this thinking only
belongs to oneself. Existential inwardness, then, is not inward looking, but is rather
founded upon its relations as it exists in-the-world.
As no criteria are available to verify claims to ‘objective truth’, the existential focus
is upon the notion of ‘subjective truth’—that is how one relates to what one believes,
or the horizon of one’s understanding. All truth, in this sense, is related to the being
of the individual, but because being is described as ‘subjective’, Heidegger (1996,
p. 208) went to great lengths to explain that this is not to be understood as
arbitrariness of the individual. Rather than consider ‘truth’ from the traditional
epistemological perspective as the correspondence between statement and ‘fact’,
truth here is understood in terms of the Greek aletheia. This term refers to the
uncovering of hidden things, thereby ‘taking them out of their concealment’
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 202). One’s subjectivity can be ‘in’ truth (Heidegger, 1988,
p. 18) in this regard through how she or he relates. Heidegger (1988, p. 217) argued
that truth and being true both have the individual’s mode of being. Belonging to the
truth of being is referred to as authenticity. Therefore an authentic understanding of
one’s own subjectivity is in truth, by how a meaning, a phenomenon, is understood
in relation to oneself by the how through which one relates. To construe one’s
subjectivity as being solely composed of conceptual propositions makes it as ‘ab-
stract’ and uncertain as abstract objectivity itself, and fails to grasp the inwardness
and certitude of will that ‘are indeed subjectivity’ (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 141).
Through his pseudonym Climacus, Kierkegaard discussed the importance of
subjective truth when compared with objective truth. He stated that:
When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively
as an object to which the knower relates himself. What is reflected upon is not the
relation but that what he relates himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which
he relates himself is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth. When the
question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual’s relation is reflected upon
subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even
if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth. [emphasis removed] (Kierkegaard,
1992, vol 1, p. 199)
Immediately following this statement, Kierkegaard’s Climacus refers to God as an
example, and explained that the issue was not God—the what or the object
himself—but the God-relation from the perspective of the one who has faith. The
implication of this view is that spiritual development is not so much a pursuit to
investigate and verify the existence of things (such as beings, deities, even ideas and
beliefs) in an objective manner, but rather an investigation of how one relates to
these.
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An existential framework of spirituality 11
One of the key questions for Existentialist philosophy is ‘Who am I?’. If it is asked
objectively, it could be construed to ask more appropriately ‘What am I?’ as in ‘What
is my being?’. However, Heidegger concluded that, objectively speaking, being
cannot be defined ontologically any more accurately than with the statement that
‘being is being’, or just ‘being is’. Rather than the what, however, people are much
more interested in the who, as in ‘Who am I?’ and ‘What is the meaning of my very
being?’. This is characteristic of how Heidegger defined the individual through his
notion of Dasein. While this is the emphasis of the philosophy, it does not imply an
acceptance of relativism where any object of belief is as good as any other.
Existentialist philosophy does not take a relativistic view of knowledge but simply
understands its contingency. The possibilities for how an individual relates to the
more objective what depends to a degree upon the culturally embedded meanings
presumed to be associated with it. The existence of the subject is in relation to the
what through a meaning-making relation. This perspective does not promote indi-
vidualism but its relational character is considered here to be most important for
spirituality (Hay, 2000).
The individual as relation
The individual is not understood as atomistic or detached from the world, because
each entity is already historical in her or his being. The concept of the individual as
relation is derived from the notion that one is in-the-world. The individual cannot
be understood in any condition outside or before being constituted by the relations
of being in-the-world (Heidegger, 1959, p. 74; 1996, p. 2). The notion of the
‘existing individual’ refers to a being that is inseparable from her or his relation with
the social and physical environments. The self is described as ‘spirit’ and as the
‘relation which relates to itself’ (Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 43), a purposeful spiritual will
(Nietzsche, 1989, p. 162) and the relationship ‘of responding to being’ (Heidegger,
1969, p. 31). This individual is inseparable from these relations and is understood
as being constituted by them. However, through agency, the individual has some
freedom to choose the significance of the relations to his or her own meaning of
existence.
Spirituality from an existential perspective does not primarily aim at the objective
verification of subjective meanings, but rather it emphasizes how the individual
relates to them. The individual can be ‘in truth’ if her or his ‘how of this relation is
in truth’ (Kierkegaard, 1992, vol.1, p. 199). This is demonstrated through Victor
Frankl’s (1959) writings about his experiences in Nazi concentration camps. The
important existential issue of identity that he raised in this instance was how one
related to and made sense and meaning of the facticity of being a prisoner, and not
from the fact of simply being categorized as a prisoner.
It is in this context that the notion of ‘subjective truth’ refers not to the truth
criteria of a particular belief or meaning, but to the way that an individual relates.
This context of spirituality, where personal existence and meaning making are most
significant, requires subjectivity. However, Kierkegaard (1992, vol.1, p. 76) reminds
us that to transcend the subjective self in order to verify claims to truth in contexts
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other than the spiritual or religious would be more appropriately understood as
‘objective thinking’. It is impossible to verify that one’s understanding of the
meaning of life is objectively true, because one cannot transcend one’s subjectivity.
Therefore, no universal meaning of life can be assumed. As Ellin (1995, p. 325)
argues, ‘giving meaning to your life is something you must do for yourself. And you
must do it, as the existentialists quite correctly point out, without any sure proof that
what you are doing is correct’. The emphasis upon the relation that one has towards
meanings implies that one can ‘hold firmly to what I believe to be true, even though
I know it might conceivably be false’ (Polanyi, 1958, p. 214). As Kierkegaard has
argued:
What matters is to find my purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall
do; the crucial thing is to find a truth that is truth for me, to find the idea for which I
am willing to live and die. (Kierkegaard, 1987, vol. 2, p. 361)
Kierkegaard’s object of ‘God’ in this example could be substituted by other ‘whats’
or categories of thought, understood as conceivably false or objectively uncertain
(Kierkegaard, 1992, vol.1, p. 203). His emphasis here is upon the nature of one’s
subjectivity and one’s passion and commitment to it. The approach that aims to
verify the subjective meanings themselves may become more theological than
spiritual. Existential spirituality focuses on the relation one has to relevant and
personal meanings from such frameworks and does not place as great an emphasis
upon seeking meanings about frameworks, although this latter aspect must still play
a part in the contingency of one’s spirituality. It may be the case that through
examining a framework in a more inter-subjective (or ‘objective’) manner, the
individual may come to understand it as personally insignificant and meaningless,
and reject it altogether. Alternatively, previously rejected frameworks may be con-
sidered as offering greater significance through inter-subjective engagements. Such
engagements are considered here to be a central component to an educative
environment.
The individual as culturally embedded
Existentially, all individuals are understood to be in-the-world, where the ‘world’
includes the ‘external’ frameworks found in formal religions and world-views. From
an existential perspective of spirituality there is the potential to embrace an engage-
ment with formalized religions and world-views, in such a manner that one evaluates
one’s relation to them, and the reasons upon which these evaluations are based. The
individual is already a historically and culturally embedded being, but can re-evalu-
ate how he or she relates to the things that have been received from society as
particular meanings become disclosed.
As an individual attempts to make sense of the world he or she is in, personal
identity and the meaning of life operate from an already existing horizon of
understanding. This horizon consists to a large extent of meanings received from
one’s culture. One cannot ‘think’ or reason without these because they constitute
what one thinks with. These meanings may often not consist in accurate representa-
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An existential framework of spirituality 13
tions of formal frameworks, but they nevertheless represent the ‘world’ as inter-
preted and understood by the individual.
As a consequence of people’s not committing themselves to a dichotomy between
‘objective’ cosmological world-views and ‘subjective’ personal meanings, an existen-
tial model of spirituality is able to present a view that is not tied to religiosity. One
advantage that this model has over the ‘religious’ ones that Long (2000), Wright
(2000) and others propose, is that it does not just involve imposing an external
framework of meanings upon the individual, in the assumption that spiritual mean-
ings can be transmitted from without to within. As Ellin (1995, p. 304) remarks, ‘no
new information’ or ‘external’ body of knowledge, could count as the meaning of
life.
In addition to claiming from this existential framework that spirituality is not
something that can be developed by imposing information from the ‘outside’, there
is also a rejection of the Platonic view that meaning can be developed simply by
drawing it out from ‘inside’ the individual. While ‘subjectivity’, ‘subjective truth’ and
‘inward looking’ are terms often referred to by this perspective, they do not indicate
that personal inner truth can ‘emerge’ independently from being-in-the-world. The
individual is not atomistic nor exists in a detached way from the world, and so there
is no independent inner realm to be accessed. The self is a relation that relates and
therefore is inseparable from the cultural world of its facticity.
The ‘world’ into which one finds oneself thrown is social and cultural. It provides
the meanings and understandings for how one conducts one’s life in order to comply
with what is expected of the norm. Existentialist philosophy contends that the
individual is greatly influenced by these relations in the world yet, far from becoming
totally determined by them, is able to exercise a degree of agency that enables the
formation of personal views and commitments. The individual in other words, has
choice.
The individual as free to choose
While the individual is understood to be embedded within a particular culture, this
does not negate agency. As has been previously argued, a certain freedom can be
exercised with regards to how one relates to the meanings that one receives from a
culture (Wertsche, 1998). A certain ‘space’ can be created between the frameworks
provided by a society and the individually created meanings that offer personal
significance. This space can be described as presenting a ‘dangerous’ tension
between ‘the upper millstone of its traditional definition, as a particular path given
by a tradition or community, and the lower of its modern and post-modern
definition as the individual’s exalted or transcending experience’ (Chater, 2000,
p. 194). The dangerous existence between these two ultimate concepts is one of
struggle, and it is argued by Chater that spirituality is in this encounter. He describes
this as ‘The pain-filled struggle with the contradictions in and between personal
life-experience and received, authoritative wisdom. It is a place of contradiction,
conflict, pain and growth’ (Chater, 2000, p. 200). Spirituality is similarly described
by Carr (1999, p. 462) to be ‘about struggle, anxiety, temptation, loss, alienation,
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14 R. S. Webster
defeat, and even despair’. From an existential perspective there is no support for the
metaphor of a ‘space’ that exists between these apparently polar opposites. However,
it is argued here that spiritual development does require this sort of anguish and
struggle as one strives to exercise one’s sense of freedom and decide which meanings
offer greater personal significance, and therefore how one relates to these.
According to this existential framework, all individuals have a degree of auton-
omy, where the ‘self’ is often referred to as ‘freedom’ (Kierkegaard, 1987, vol. 2,
pp. 214–215). But it is argued that people do not readily employ their freedom and
indeed tend to dread it. This has implications for the development of spirituality.
While the existing individual is already spiritual, this spirituality can be developed
further through exercising her or his freedom. ‘Spirit’ refers to a dynamic presence,
so the spiritual dimension is also dynamic, being ‘the disciplined path along which
‘existence’ is enhanced’ (Macquarrie, 1972, p. 71) via ‘moments of decision’. The
individual operates from a set of intentions based upon certain meanings gained
from frameworks inherent in the world in which she or he has presence. However,
the life that does not—and may even refuse to—accept the freedom to decide for
oneself and become personally responsible for what meanings are to count as
significant is said to be inauthentic, and is ‘lost’ in the crowd. Therefore, development
of the spiritual dimension is understood to involve the freedom to choose.
There is encouragement from this existential framework of spirituality for one to
choose authentically (Heidegger, 1988, p. 170) oneself (Kierkegaard, 1987, vol. 2,
p. 259), and to create and own one’s possibilities. Consequently, this model is quite
different from those that emphasize the immersion of the individual in particular
traditions of various world-views. Such models only consider the internal consist-
ency offered by formal frameworks or the diversity of world-views ‘out there’,
without including the aspect of personal relevance being made with its associated
ownership and commitment. These models could potentially promote only inau-
thentic spirituality. The existential model goes beyond this, and addresses the aspect
of how an individual relates to and possibly finds personal significance and meanings
in religious and other world-views, by exercising freedom to choose these meanings
as his or her own.
The holism of the individual
The term ‘presence’ that is often used to describe one’s being implies a holistic
concept, where individuals are argued to consist of the various relationships that
they are in as a result of being a presence-with-others. These relations include the
‘not yet’ (future) possibilities that are able to be projected from one’s situation.
Having presence in differing categories of relationships does not, however, necess-
arily fragment individuals as some claim (Bauman, 1995, p. 91; Standish, 1995,
p. 121). Kierkegaard (1987, vol. 2, p. 327) has argued that ‘it is dangerous to have
become so fragmented’. The individual is a relation (singular) that relates to itself
(Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 43). The individual is able to pull all these aspects together
to form a connected and unified whole. Each human identity is regarded as a holistic
presence that relates to these relationships, in the sense that it is the same self
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An existential framework of spirituality 15
present in each role (Schrag, 1997, p. 17), although there may be paradoxes
acknowledged between certain ‘fragments’. As argued by Heidegger (1996, p. 356),
‘Everyday Da-sein is dispersed in the multiplicity of what ‘happens’ daily … So if it
(Dasein) wants to come to itself, it must first pull itself together from the dispersion
and the disconnectedness of what has just ‘happened’’. Existentialist philosophy
portrays these ‘various presences’ as ‘one’, due to the unifying horizon of time—the
moment—and also because they are united by care (Heidegger, 1996, p. 180). This
‘care’ or ‘passion’ (Kierkegaard) is used to describe the holistic and unified concern
one has for one’s existence, and for one’s future possibilities.
One’s spirituality includes a certain rationality and as such, recognizes its limits.
Existentialist philosophy is not opposed to rationality but is against abstractness
(Barrett, 1990, p. 269), because abstraction is uninterested in the existing individual
(Kierkegaard, 1992, vol. 1, p. 302). As well as being rational all the other aspects
related to being a whole person are included. In this sense one’s own meaning of life
cannot simply be an ‘intellectual knowing’ because such a meaning is entwined with
emotions, intentions and actions - one’s whole presence. Such a meaning is part of
one’s being and may not necessarily be clear to the conscience. This is why a model
of authenticity can be regarded as superior to a model of autonomy because the
latter implies only rationality while the former involves the whole person (Leahy,
1994, p. 448).
Kierkegaard referred to this holistic involvement of the individual as involving the
‘passions’. He argued that ‘for the existing person, passion is existence at its very
highest—and we are, after all, existing persons’ (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 197). Ac-
cording to this existential model, choice includes some rational activity, but it is also
more than this. As one understands the significance of meanings that give sense to
one’s particular experiences, one responds holistically by forming views and commit-
ments that incorporate more than just rational or intellectual knowing. One goes
‘beyond’ these by a leap which involves the commitment of one’s whole being, in a
passionate sense, as one understands that one’s very existence and meaning of
existence rest upon this decisive choice.
The individual as a meaning-maker
Existentialist philosophy presumes that human individuals are universally character-
ized by having a concern about the meaning of their being (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 10,
15), and spirituality is understood to be an engagement with the meaning of one’s
life. Spirituality, then, is an inherent aspect of the question of the meaning of being,
which Heidegger claimed to be a part of Dasein’s very nature. The individual is
understood through meanings that are either found within formal cultural frame-
works or created by the person. As a relation, these meanings take on a greater
significance spiritually when the individual makes these meanings his or her own.
The meanings that have central importance for this existential framework of spiritu-
ality are those that relate specifically to one’s being and the fundamental purposes
of one’s life.
It is recognized that some scholars have divided the issue of one’s being, that is of
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one’s life, into two questions—‘What is the meaning of life?’ and ‘What is the
meaning of my life?’. These have been described as the cosmological and terrestrial
(Yalom, 1980), or as religious traditions and personal attitudes (Dorr, 1990). From
an existential perspective the question of the cosmological/religious tradition (the
possible meaning) is not the primary one—as is apparent from the phenomenologi-
cal religious view.
It has already been discussed in this paper as to why any ‘objective knowing’ is a
‘risk’ from this perspective (or is even possible). It is claimed by Kierkegaard that all
meanings lack any absolute certainty and so are contingent. In this vein, Kierkegaard
argued that even within the cultural context of his Christian Denmark the only proof
of Christianity would be the second coming of Christ himself. Until such an event,
each individual is left responsible for deciding upon a faith in a meaning of life that
is meaningful for himself or herself, but for which there is no guarantee that it is the
correct one. Thus, the spiritual dimension never ‘arrives’ at an ultimate meaning
(except possibly when one’s death brings an end to the project). It is by nature
always subject to further scrutiny.
However, from this existential perspective the terrestrial/personal question (my
meaning) is also not to be the only issue. Although researchers in the fields of
psychology and psychotherapy identify that this question is a specifically existential
one, for this existential framework the importance of cultural influences—and
therefore the need to recognize such sources—is also acknowledged. This framework
of spirituality involves the integration of both the cosmological and the terrestrial
questions into the singular issue of the meaning of self and the universe where
‘nothing is left out’ (Britton, 1969, p. 20). According to this framework it is
understood that these questions should not be reduced to ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
concerns, because both form an holistic understanding of the issue of being for the
individual.
Existential philosophy is commonly believed to take life of and by itself, as having
no inherent meaning (Murdoch, 1999, p. 75), but this does not mean that one
cannot recognize a deity or formal philosophy ‘out there’ that is able to provide a
meaning for life. Existentialist philosophies, after all, can embrace a religious view of
life, as exemplified in Kierkegaard. It is beings who have meanings and purposes, not
abstract ideas such as ‘life’ and ‘education’. What the existential view contends is
that a meaning of life must be contingent although that contingency may be realized
by the individual’s relations with a deity or world-view. There is seen to be no
universal meaning of life that inherently emerges for all individuals from the facticity
of their relationships as a result of simply having a presence-in-the-world. If there is
a meaning of life ‘out there’, it can only become a meaning of life for the individual
if she or he relates to it in such a way that it becomes personally significant and
meaningful.
According to this existential framework, there is a certain moral obligation
required of the authentic individual to his or her fellow human beings. This is based
upon the understanding that the individual is a being-in-the-world-with-others.
Such a notion places value on individuals as attached members-with-others rather
than as detached entities (Morris, 1990, p. 51). Consequently, there ‘is an ethical
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relationship, a relationship of infinite responsibility for the other’ (Biesta, 1998,
p. 14). As such, because one can exercise a certain existentiell understanding for
oneself, this is to be projected for others, thereby acknowledging them as fellow
beings and not as ‘objects’ or things. Heidegger argued that ‘Being-in-the-world is
initially absorbed in the world taken care of’ (Heidegger, 1996, p. 161), where’
taking care of the world’ is guided by circumspection. This holistic understanding of
circumspection, which includes one’s meaning of being, identity and purpose of life,
acknowledges other people as fellow entities in-the-world. By definition one’s
dealings with other people should not be reduced to I-thing relations (Heidegger,
1996, p. 100).
According to Martin Buber, other people are to be considered as ‘Thous’ and not
‘its’, and therefore people should relate to one another in I–Thou relationships. He
argued that the notion of personal responsibility that accompanies one’s freedom
must ‘be brought back from the province of specialized ethics, of an ‘ought’ … into
that of lived life’ (Buber, 2002, p. 18), and it should therefore be an obligation which
lies with each ‘existing individual’. Buber’s notion of the I–Thou relationship was
addressed by Heidegger (1988, p. 278), who argued that each entity in the relation
should be seen in terms of being-in-the-world and therefore being-with each other.
Others are not to be treated as isolated egos but rather as fellow beings. There is not
a requirement to ‘unself’ in order to acknowledge the ‘other reality’ of other egos
(Cooper, 1999, p. 174), because there is only the one reality in which beings exist
together.
The individual, according to this existential framework, should be heedful of
having and acting out of concern for his of her fellow-beings. Although one is free,
one is not a spectator to the lives of others, but is a fellow participant with them. For
the individual there should be no alienation from others. According to this frame-
work, there should be recognition of the freedom of others, although the extent to
which one is obligated to maximize freedoms of others cannot be universalized, as
each existing individual must decide this from her or his own situation. Therefore,
a moral ‘way of being’ towards others is recommended from this existential frame-
work, even although one’s spirituality, from which one makes evaluations, could
conceivably require the ethical to be suspended—although this is highly unlikely,
especially within an educational context.
Conclusion
The existential framework described here is able to transcend the religious/secular
divide which so often is understood to be problematic when trying to promote
spiritual development in non-religious contexts. This existential perspective is able
to embrace both religious and non-religious views, and therefore it can be made
available for all learners. Through this framework attention is given to how one
relates rather than to what ‘objective’ internal consistencies might exist in certain
theological or ideological frameworks. This existential framework centres the con-
cern an individual has for his or her relations with other entities that he or she is
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in-the-world with, in order to establish a personally significant meaning for his or her
existence.
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